O4N3JOSS 1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK -----x 2 3 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 4 23 CR 68 (JPO) V. 5 JEREMY JOSEPH, 6 Defendant. ----x Sentencing 7 8 New York, N.Y. April 23, 2024 9 11:00 a.m. 10 Before: 11 HON. J. PAUL OETKEN, 12 District Judge 13 APPEARANCES 14 15 DAMIAN WILLIAMS United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York 16 JAMIE BAGLIEBTER 17 DIARRA GUTHRIE Assistant United States Attorneys 18 JEREMY JOSEPH 19 Pro Se Defendant 20 21 22 23 24 25

THE DEPUTY CLERK: United States of America v. Jeremy Joseph.

Starting with government, counsel, please state your name for the record.

MS. BAGLIEBTER: Good morning, your Honor. Jamie
Bagliebter for the government, and with me at counsel's table
is AUSA Diarra Guthrie.

THE COURT: Good morning.

MR. JOSEPH: Jeremy Joseph, pro se.

THE COURT: Good morning. You all can remain seated.

Today we're scheduled for a sentencing hearing in this case. Mr. Joseph pleaded guilty on November 29, 2023, to two counts of threatening physical harm by interstate communication. We talked at the last conference about Mr. Joseph having received the presentence report, and having an opportunity to submit any objections, and also whether he had the materials he needed to prepare for sentencing.

I did sign an order on April 9 directing former standby counsel at the Federal Defenders to make sure they delivered another copy of the file, relevant documents, to Mr. Joseph at MDC. And Ms. Lenox informed the Court by e-mail the next day they had sent everything to him and would do it again.

So Mr. Joseph, let me start by asking you if you've received everything you need in terms of case-related

documents.

MR. JOSEPH: So, update, no, I have not. With that said, I'm fine with proceeding with sentencing. There's still materials that I've not received. When we last had — when we last were in court, I didn't have my legal notebook. I'm not sure how it got lost from MDC to here. But I was able to draft out the motions again that I was planning on submitting last time.

I still have not received the transcripts of all the proceedings. This wouldn't just include the trial and pretrial, but also the transcripts starting from day one when I first came to court. I need that for current and also future proceedings. I also have similar charges also in Eastern Texas. I have not received an update on that.

The second is motion to unseal this case. I've actually been talking to a few legal nonprofit groups, including a journalist, and one thing that would help in terms of getting some of these things going is actually unsealing the case just for legal transparency.

And also, I did receive some materials from the Federal Defenders. Once again, the file is incomplete. I've made a motion for sanctions against Federal Defenders, just because they haven't applied, as well as an exhibit outlining all the materials I do need. This would include work product, communication, subpoenaed materials, as well as legal materials

that I was supposed to receive from lawyers that I just never got.

With that said, I want to submit the motions.

Separate from that, I'm fine proceeding with sentencing.

Yesterday I got the final PSI. There still seem to be some things that were outstanding, but I got the chance to go over the materials. Right now I am not going to be objecting to anything and I'm fine just getting it over with.

THE COURT: Getting what?

MR. JOSEPH: Getting the sentencing over with.

THE COURT: So, couple things. First of all, you haven't sent a written submission relating to sentencing, have you?

MR. JOSEPH: I have not.

THE COURT: Do you want to do that? I can give you time to prepare one if you'd like.

MR. JOSEPH: That's okay. I do have an affidavit for designation. I want to be designated at Fort Dix. There's a couple reasons. It's got, from my understanding, jail programming that fits my needs, and its close proximity to friends that can visit.

But, outside the motions and the affidavit to be designated to Fort Dix, I think I'm good and I can submit these things formally to the Court.

THE COURT: You referred to a motion. What's the

1 motion?

MR. JOSEPH: Yeah, there's three motions and I can hand them over to the marshal who can give them to you and I can file them in court. Right.

Motion to unseal the case, motion for the transcripts of all proceedings, and then the motion for sanctions against the Federal Defenders for not complying with the order to provide my case file.

THE COURT: Okay. Do any of those motions or anything else you indicated you haven't received relate to sentencing?

Is any of that anything you think would be helpful for sentencing? Because if so, we can put this off.

MR. JOSEPH: No. So, I think it could be relevant, but I don't think it's critical where it would change anything. So I outlined things that are outstanding from the case file that I've not received, but these are motions that can be ruled on and are separate from sentencing. Like, the motions that I am submitting today originally were supposed to be submitted last time I got to court. The marshals aren't sure where my legal notebook went. Even when I got back to MDC, they didn't have it, so I redrafted them again.

THE COURT: So the case is not under seal. There are certain -- the case is not under seal. The case is public on the docket. There are certain redactions in certain filings.

MR. JOSEPH: Right. For the protective order.

THE COURT: When you say under seal, you mean the redacted portions?

MR. JOSEPH: Well, think that was removing the protective order, but we already addressed that. From my understanding the indictment was originally sealed, and so some information wasn't available to the public. If it's unsealed as of today, then the motion here isn't necessary.

THE COURT: It is unsealed.

MS. BAGLIEBTER: That's correct.

MR. JOSEPH: So then it would be the motion for the transcripts of all proceedings. I still don't have those. And I was hoping to get that directly from the Court, given I've been unable to get those transcripts from the Federal Defenders. Nor do I know if the Federal Defenders actually have them in their possession.

THE COURT: All right. So, my first question is whether you want those for sentencing. Because the purpose of today is to determine an appropriate sentence, and I want to give you a chance to address the issues that pertain to sentencing. And if you think you need any of those transcripts or other documents, I'm happy to put this off and give you a chance to review that.

MR. JOSEPH: No. So once again, I want to reiterate I'm fine proceeding to sentencing. I just want future legal proceedings as well as current, because it will be helpful.

do want the transcripts as well as actually all the filings that have happened in the case as well, though weren't included in the case file.

THE COURT: Then I also want to address the issue of objections to the draft presentence report. So under Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the probation officer must give the presentence report to the defendant at least 35 days before sentencing, unless the defendant waives that period. So do you remember when you first received the presentence report?

MR. JOSEPH: I received it about maybe two-and-a-half weeks ago, but I recall when we came to court last time that I waived the time requirements for receiving the PSI as well as sending an objection.

THE COURT: And again, the purpose of that is obviously the -- you've now read the presentence report, right?

MR. JOSEPH: It was delivered to me. Just to be on the record, I received it yesterday. Prior to recall, I was given about five minutes to go through it. I was not -- I'm not able to hold onto it. So I was able to review it, there didn't seem to be any changes from the draft. So at this point I have no objections.

THE COURT: But when you saw the initial draft, were you able to have enough time to read it?

MR. JOSEPH: I glanced through it. It didn't look

like there were any changes from the draft so, yeah, no objections.

THE COURT: But just to be clear, have you read it?

Do you need more time to read it?

MR. JOSEPH: No, I don't need more time.

THE COURT: And again, you have a right to have 35 days before sentencing with the presentence report. Do you want that additional time? I'm happy to give you that additional time.

MR. JOSEPH: I've waived the time requirement.

THE COURT: Do you --

MR. JOSEPH: And I don't want the time.

THE COURT: You don't want the time. Same with objections. Are there any objections you want to make orally today or in writing?

MR. JOSEPH: Not right now.

THE COURT: Anything the government wants to add sort of preliminarily about these issues?

MS. BAGLIEBTER: No, your Honor. I think the Court has sufficiently inquired of the defendant that he has had the opportunity to read and review the PSR. To the extent, while there may not be changes between the initial and the final PSR, of course the final PSR includes additional information including probation's recommendation. So, if the defendant has not had sufficient time to review that piece of information,

perhaps we could either give him that time now or confirm that that's okay.

THE COURT: So, the final version, last few pages is a recommendation section from the probation department. And they recommend a particular sentence. In this case they recommend a sentence of imprisonment of 30 months, which is the bottom of what they regarded as the guideline range, as well as 3 years of supervised release. And then they had an explanation of that.

Did you have a chance to see that?

MR. JOSEPH: I did.

THE COURT: Do you need any additional time to go over that?

MR. JOSEPH: No, I don't.

THE COURT: Do you feel okay today to proceed with discussing issues relating to an appropriate sentence?

MR. JOSEPH: I do.

THE COURT: I do find the defendant has waived the time requirements of Rule 32 with respect to the presentence report, that he's chosen not to file written objections and a written submission relating to sentencing.

So we'll go forward with sentencing today, which I believe is the defendant's wish. I asked him about objections.

I'll ask the government. Ms. Bagliebter, does government have any objections after reading the presentence

report?

MS. BAGLIEBTER: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: So, I adopt the facts set forth in the presentence report as my findings of fact for sentencing, which findings must be made by a preponderance of the evidence at sentencing. Of course I've reviewed the presentence report with the addendum and sentencing recommendation, final version dated April 16, 2024, the government's submission dated April 19, 2024, and I've also read the two days of trial that we had, the transcripts of that, and the allocution of the defendant when he pled guilty on November 29, 2023.

So the starting point in sentencing is the sentencing guidelines, which is a base offense level on one side and a criminal history category on the other side.

Just to be clear, Mr. Joseph, you're familiar with the sentencing quidelines?

MR. JOSEPH: I am.

THE COURT: Have you seen this chart?

MR. JOSEPH: I have.

THE COURT: The chart has the criminal history category on one side and a number on the other side, which is the offense level. So, the first thing I need to do is to calculate what the right offense level is. Now, the government's submission goes through and agrees with the presentence report calculation. I think I have one question

about that.

The base offense level is 12 under Section 2A6.1 of the guidelines, given this offense. Because two or more threats were involved, there is an increase of two points under 2A6.1(b)(2).

And then the next question is under 3A1.1(a), is there an additional three points which applies if the Court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intentionally selected the victims because of their religion or actual or perceived religion in this case. And I know the government explained their view that those three additional points should be added. Anything you want to add on that?

MS. BAGLIEBTER: No, your Honor. We are happy to answer any of the Court's questions with respect to that issue, but we do think the enhancement applies here.

THE COURT: Mr. Joseph, do you want to address that?

MR. JOSEPH: I don't.

THE COURT: So I will ask the government questions about that. That is known as the hate crime enhancement. And it's certainly true the threats in this case involved antisemitic language. The two victims at issue in this case were Jewish, and there was antisemitic language in the threatening communications.

However, I'm not sure I can find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant selected the victims because of their

religion, which is a very specific definition of hate crime in the sentencing guidelines, and it also requires a finding beyond a reasonable doubt, which is unlike most other provisions of the guidelines.

And the reason I say that is because when you look at all the evidence in the case, which I reviewed, there is antisemitic language to others, and the people who received these threats were people that the defendant had a connection with. They're people he knew. The Morgan Stanley people he worked with a decade ago are the victims in this case. There is antisemitic language sent to the Texas probate judge who he obviously had a connection to through the case out there. There's also lots of other hateful language, white trash, you know, derogatory language based on a Latino status, the N word multiple times, homophobic language. So there's lots of kind of undifferentiated broad hateful language, and that is disturbing and I think it's culpable conduct and I think it's harmful in the way that hate speech is harmful.

But on the question whether he selected the victims because of their status as Jewish or perceived status as Jewish, I don't know that I can say beyond a reasonable doubt that he did, as opposed to sort of opportunistically coming up with hateful language about the various people, in many cases who turned out to be victims, but who were essentially people he had a connection to.

So that's the question I have, if you'd like to address it.

MS. BAGLIEBTER: Thank you, your Honor. I would like to address it.

I think what your Honor is grappling with makes sense and I appreciate the perspective of the Court. I think there are a few problems with seeing the analysis and seeing the enhancement of a hate crime or seeing the application of the hate crimes enhancement limited in the way that you suggest. Here's the things that I think are too limiting.

One, by saying that the hate crimes enhancement does not apply because Mr. Joseph knew these individuals suggests that you can only be selecting your victim — it has to be a stranger that you see wearing some indication or advertising in some way or because of their color of their skin, showing they are a member of this protected class, and you target them only for that basis. That's not my understanding of what the standard is. It does need to be because of their membership in that protected class, here as members of the Jewish faith or the perception that they are. But it doesn't need to be the only reason. And in most places in our law where we have a because standard or a but-for standard, it's not the only. It's one, it can be one, it can be a significant motivating factor, but it's not the only.

And so here, the question is not to me whether they

were selected only because of their religion or because he had these grievance against them. But rather, did the grievances that he have elevate to the point where they became targets of these threats, in part because of their religion and his hatred towards that group.

And I think what the Court has to look at to make this beyond a reasonable doubt finding is the defendant's own words and the frequency of those words. And so, when the defendant is targeting them, he is using their membership or perceived membership in this group to elevate the harm that he is bringing to them. And so the Court has to wonder, well, why did these victims — why did these people who have wronged him receive these threats. And I think he's telling the Court why they received these threats. His own words, what he chooses to say to them, is what is going through his mind at the time he's sending these death threats.

As we laid out in our submission, he identified these individuals as Jewish from when he was first complaining about them years before the death threats happened. And then his grievance against them maintained and festered, and now we are talking 12 years later. Why come back to these people? And if he was devoid of this hate towards this group, would these people still be in his mind? Would he still be saying the things that he's saying?

Look, we can't go inside of his mind. He's had the

opportunity to represent otherwise to the Court and has not. So we have to look at what we have. And we have over and over again him choosing to use hateful language about their Jewish identity to attack them.

So, I don't know why he's still thinking about them 12 years later. But it looks to me, based on the words that he's saying, over and over again, that it has to do with their Jewish identity that they have stuck out in his mind. And that suggests that, in part, because they are Jewish, he felt that they — they remained in his mind, his grievance against them remained in his mind, and they were targeted in this instance.

Then your Honor also mentions, well, it's not just them that received these threats, but it's all these other individuals that he also uses antisemitic language. To me, that is evidence in favor of the fact that he was selecting victims, not just the statutory victims in this case, but part of his broader pattern of conduct, he was selecting victims based on their membership in these groups, and specifically a Jewish identity.

THE COURT: But, sorry to interrupt. Those are all very good points, but there is also counterexamples where people, like DCVC, if that's the name of the entity, colleagues there where it was just a white non-Jewish woman, he would use a word like white Barbie or something. That's why I say opportunistic. It feels like he had grievances of various

people, and when there was a pertinent hateful characteristic, a relevant characteristic as to which he could use hateful language, he did. But were they selected because of that status.

MS. BAGLIEBTER: On DCVC in particular, it is worth noting one of his primary targets was Jewish and was receiving threats containing antisemitic language.

Now, without a doubt, there are other people who come into the orbit of his threats, that if they're part of another protected class, they get a different piece of hateful language. And if not, they get something more generic like a white Barbie. It is not like his hate is exclusively to people in these classes. That's not the standard. The standard is not did he send death threats to anyone else. It's were these victims in some way selected because of their protected class. I do think we see a frequency of Jewish targets in his behavior.

Also in some of the filings that are more generic, facing hundreds of people, you see the heil Hitler language, you see the language that is antisemitic in nature and being — which is sort of elevating the antisemitic language over some of the other threats that we see.

Now, to go to your other point, your Honor, which I think you touch on here, yes, he is using hateful language about other minority groups as well. But I don't think that

that is mutually exclusive to him selecting a victim because of their identity as part of the Jewish minority. If there is wider spread hate towards various groups, various minority groups, and he's using hateful language towards all of them, I don't have the research on this, but I think there is probably some instances where there's sort of co-morbidity for lack of a better word, and there is hate towards more than one protected class, and that's conveyed over and over again.

So I don't see that, again, I don't see that as taking away the idea he is selecting them because of their Jewish identity, but maybe suggesting that he selects these victims because of their membership in the Jewish faith, and other victims because of their membership in other minority groups, and he feels hate towards that as well or he sends those messages with those hateful messages.

Look, I appreciate that there is no question that there is another motivating factor here, which are these personal grievances he has. But to ignore the hateful language that is very focused and antisemitic and repetitive over and over again, even for victims who weren't in fact Jewish. For example, the California intake attorney was not, but she says she is often mistaken for a Jewish person from her last name, and it was clear from those e-mails that there was a focus with the references to Auschwitz, the questions about whether his previous lawyers he had worked with was Jewish, there was this

pervasive discussion of an identity with the Jewish faith that comes up over and over again, that we see sort of elevated above with many of the victims that he's targeting, actual or perceived.

And so I do think it meets the beyond a reasonable doubt standard even though — because otherwise, any time you had another reason, or you had a grievance against someone that maybe was more impactful on you because of your hatred towards this member of this protected class, you would not be able to apply the enhancement.

THE COURT: I don't know if that's true. I take your point that the hateful language should not be ignored, and I'm not suggesting it should be. I'm just wondering whether this situation establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that they were selected because of their status as Jewish.

And I guess it seems to me the standard might be something like the counterfactual, consider that he had exactly the same situation, he had a difficult experience with them a decade ago working at Morgan Stanley, and imagine neither one was Jewish, but everything else in the world was the same. And he had bad experience there, later says he has PTSD about it, and then would he, in the context of all these communications he's sending at this time, would he have selected them to receive some of them? Now, admittedly, they would be different because they wouldn't perhaps have the antisemitic language.

But if they still had been selected, then I'm not sure 3A1.1 applies.

MR. JOSEPH: Can I interject because you're talking about me.

So, one, I think this is a lot of speculation. Two is, I think we are going to put things on the record, just make sure they're correct.

While I did have issues at Morgan Stanley with these two employees, the references even later are usually through FBI intakes, notes that had been provided to the FBI. Because not only was my identity stolen, but I was receiving threats myself. And every time the FBI asked me, either on the phone or in person, these people who are comprising your accounts or targeting, who do you think could be the potential assailants. I was at a loss, and I said I think the only people that I have a major issue with in the past were these two people.

In those intakes you don't see any reference about the Jewish faith, and any of the e-mails that actually I had with these two victims, there was never any mention of their Jewish faith as well.

And I'm thinking of what else the prosecutor has said that references me referencing them about them being Jewish over the last 13 years, I don't see it. I never got the entire case file from Houston. I never got any of the e-mails from Morgan Stanley as well as the HR records of David Friedman and

Sara Slifka.

So while you can make an argument, I at least wish you would stay within the bounds of it being fact. While I pled guilty to these two e-mails, you are talking about a lot of things that are referencing other e-mails which I don't know if those are charges, but you can't say that because I've pled guilty to these e-mails that I'm now responsible for everything. The things regarding probate court, I wanted to subpoena him. I was unable to. I didn't even get all the materials from that probate court. I had a list of witnesses that I wanted from the court, and I want to remind the Court I wasn't able to have any witnesses. I had a list of 30 people that I was hoping to subpoena, some including Jewish people who are my friends and who could have accounted for things I've said and done, and I had not one.

And considering I had this prepared three months ago and I had zero witnesses, with subpoenas, there is just a lot of things missing. So to speculate on things that aren't factual, I think is just jumping ahead.

THE COURT: Let me back up. You talked about FBI reports. We are not talking about FBI intake reports. We are talking about the e-mails that you pled guilty to. And one of them says --

MR. JOSEPH: Right. You are also referencing -THE COURT: -- top it off, I actively hate Jews now.

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Seriously hate them and you. I understand why the Nazis wanted you people dead now.

Did you write that?

MR. JOSEPH: No.

THE COURT: You pled guilty to it.

MR. JOSEPH: I did.

THE COURT: So you're saying you weren't guilty?

MR. JOSEPH: I didn't have any witnesses. Right. You said it was okay not to have any witnesses.

THE COURT: Well, we never got to your case because --

MR. JOSEPH: I had no witnesses. You stopped Monday.

You said I could not call any more witnesses.

THE COURT: I already accepted your guilty plea. You admitted to that.

MR. JOSEPH: Fine.

THE COURT: So, do you want to respond to the specific issue about selecting people because of their religion?

MR. JOSEPH: No.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. BAGLIEBTER: So your Honor, I would just say we need to be limited to what's in the record, what's in the PSR, what the government can proffer to. So claims of what may or may not have been included in FBI intake is not within the scope of what the Court should be considering here.

What we can consider is what we know from the e-mails,

and as we said in our submission, between things that he's said to his close friends who have testified in court, between the language in the probate court filing, which is what starts this in the summer of 2022, which includes the antisemitic language, through the death threats to these particular victims, and in the broader course of conduct.

So in every category of evidence in this case, we see the pervasiveness of this antisemitic language. So to address the Court's counterfactual of if these individuals weren't Jewish, would they have still been a target of his ire 12 years later, I think looking at what we know, I think the answer to that is no.

He claims to have the PTSD, but remember the record is devoid of actual things that could have reasonably justified that grievance. So, he was terminated from his employment, but that was it. And there was no evidence in the record of them targeting him in any way, or keeping him from other professional opportunities —

MR. JOSEPH: -- I did flag issues at Morgan Stanley and discrimination --

MS. BAGLIEBTER: If I may continue uninterrupted and then of course Mr. Joseph can have an opportunity to respond.

Then with DCVC and individuals he targeted, which one of them primarily was an individual who was Jewish, you have what happens is he gets this review, he gets this review as

Mr. Hamer testified to, which was sort of commonplace for people who needed some assistance, and then some individuals get really drastically targeted. So, there is not a reasonable basis for the kind of decade-long hold of grievances, so we can't look to that as an explanation for why these particular individuals are held on to.

And on the other side of the ledger we have the language that he's using over and over again.

So I do think that that shows beyond a reasonable doubt. And had we continued before the jury, I think the jury would have been looking at this, and of course now it's in the Court's view to propose it. But, we are, without the defendant stating otherwise, and even with that I think we would have to question what the value of that was, but this is what we have to rely on, and this is a record beyond a reasonable doubt that the victims were in part identified and selected because of their actual or perceived membership in this class.

THE COURT: I will say, we did some research on this, and there is not much that talks about the mixed motive issue or what exactly the standard is. The courts seem to apply the actual language which is they were selected because of the prohibited characteristic. And there is one case Carlineo, where the Second Circuit refers to what District Judge Geraci did, but doesn't approve it or reject it, but just notes that the Court rejected the three-level hate crime motivation. And

this was threats to Congresswoman Omar, and the judge said that Carlineo's use of the word Muslims — did use the word Muslims, but could not find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant targeted her on account of her Muslim religion, even though she used the word, as opposed to political beliefs. That's an example.

And I think you make very good points. I think if the standard were preponderance, it might be different. I don't think I can find beyond a reasonable doubt that they were selected because of that. I think you make a very good point.

10 years earlier, he had grievances, it was a bad experience, he might have still targeted them, he might not have, but I don't think I can say that beyond a reasonable doubt their religion made a difference.

I will say that affects the guidelines, but it doesn't affect culpability. I think it would be totally reasonable if 3A1.1 were written with a broader notion of a hate crime enhancement that wouldn't be based solely on selecting the victims because of that.

So, Mr. Joseph, anything you want to add on that point?

MR. JOSEPH: No.

THE COURT: Anything else on the guidelines?

MR. JOSEPH: No.

THE COURT: So for the reasons I've just explained, I

think it's a close question, but I think given that the standard is beyond a reasonable doubt, I cannot find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intentionally selected these two victims because of their religion. And therefore, the adjusted offense level is 14, but after a multiple count adjustment, it becomes 16. The criminal history of course is I, and that results in a guideline range of 21 to 27 months under the guidelines. Of course that's advisory, it's not binding. Probation recommends 30 months, but that's on the assumption that a different guideline range applies.

So I'd like to give each of you an opportunity to speak. I've read the government's submission and obviously the presentence report. And anything the government would like to add?

MS. BAGLIEBTER: Yes, your Honor. I think I'll start with the point that your Honor raises, which the hateful language and the hateful language targeting members of the Jewish community does still have relevance from a 3553(a) factor, and that's important to think about. Because the hate crime enhancement was created, and perhaps your Honor is correct that it could have been written in a lot of different ways, but it still reflects an attitude that crimes that target a particular group of people have increased harm, and that needs to be accounted for in fashioning a sufficient but not greater than necessary sentence.

And in this case, the hateful language against the Jewish community as well as other communities, as your Honor noted that are targeted here, not only do the selected victims feel that pain, but other people who are members of those groups who see the filings on the e-filing system or who are made aware, colleagues of theirs who are made aware that these e-mails come through the system targeting their place of work and are focused on the membership of being a part of the Jewish community, that's going to impact those people differently. It makes it scary to walk down the street. It makes it scary to show your identity. And Congress has recognized that, and it's a powerful 3553(a) factor.

And it's important also in considering the importance of general deterrence, because the harm is so great, and individuals who are going to engage in criminal conduct and link that criminal conduct towards victims or have that criminal conduct related to their victims' membership, even if you don't view it as because of, but related to their victims' membership in a particular religious, racial, ethnic group, a message needs to be sent that that conduct will be recognized as an aggravating factor.

A few other things I'd like to highlight in addition to the government's submission, which I know the Court has reviewed. And the first is I want to talk about the victims again. Because at sentencing there is often a heavy focus on

the life and the circumstances of the defendant, and of course that makes sense. But the victims are also a really relevant player here. And in fashioning the sentence, thinking about how a crime has impacted the victim is important to a lot of the 3553(a) factors, including just punishment for the offense.

And here, the victims in this case, their lives were completely unended because of absolutely no fault of their own. They had to suffer through months and years of fear, that's permeated their lives and the lives of their family and their colleagues and their neighbors and others. These death threats are not just a press of a button and it's over. The ripple effect of the harm that's created when that send button is pressed is really significant. And so just punishment for that kind of offense would really need to take that into consideration.

This happened to these victims for no other reason than they were unlikely enough to have crossed paths with the defendant professionally and have upset him in some way. And because of that, they've had to take real steps that have changed their lives in terms of protecting themselves and their families and trying to feel safe.

Your Honor heard during trial from one of the two statutory victims in the case. Had the trial continued, the Court would have heard from the other victim. This was a horrible experience that had really lasting effects for them

and the other victims of the defendant's broader pattern of conduct. They were similarly traumatized by the defendant's conduct.

Your Honor heard from the victim from DCVC who you referenced earlier. He relocated his family. Think about what a huge -- not just inconvenience, but how afraid you have to be to move your whole family and your life because you don't feel safe.

Another one of the government's witnesses who started but didn't finish her testimony, you know, she was expected to testify that she's had difficult time finding stable housing since this has happened. Because she won't -- she won't live anywhere with her own name. So she has had to create this whole system of ways to mask her identity, because she feels so afraid.

Your Honor, we also had someone slated to come testify who was a prosecutor who loved their job, and after 10 years in the job, quit in part because they felt so overwhelmed by being targeted by the defendant.

These are real life-changing events that happened. These victims are never the same.

And so, while in some ways the defendant may argue or you could think of this as, oh, it's just these e-mails just get sent and no one takes them seriously. But they are really being taken seriously, and the reason you know they are going

to be taken seriously is look at how egregious the language in these e-mails are. This is not hyperbole. It is not puffery. It is specific.

You heard the victims testify about what was so terrifying about it was, you know, their pets were mentioned, family medical issues were mentioned, specific things about the offices and where they're located and how they look. That is terrifying to know that someone is thinking about these personal details about you, and then making these incredibly graphic, horrific, realistic death threats.

And so, I know the government talks about it in its submission, but I think it cannot be underscored enough what sits on the other side. The impact that this has had for the victims.

And I've mentioned general deterrence a little bit, but I do think it's also worth mentioning specific deterrence as well and the importance of that. It is correct that the defendant has pled guilty to his crimes. But there is no showing of remorse or concern about these victims. There is no way for the Court to have comfort that the defendant will not escalate his grievances against the next set of people in the same way.

And so, from a specific deterrence purpose, I think it's very important for the Court to fashion a sentence that shows if you make a choice like this, these are the

consequences that result from it. Because without that those consequences and without that accountability, I don't think we have any indication that this conduct would stop.

So for those reasons and those discussed in our submission, the government thinks that a guideline sentence — and appreciating that the Court has adjusted the guidelines, still believes that a sentence approximately where probation had placed it is appropriate here because this is really serious conduct.

THE COURT: I just wanted to ask one question. Are there pending charges in other jurisdictions?

MS. BAGLIEBTER: There is a pending federal case in the Southern District of Texas, and when the defendant was arrested, and then he waived his extradition, there was an arrest warrant both from our office and from the Southern District of Texas. So it is my understanding -- I've reached out to the Southern District of Texas, I don't have an update, but it is my understanding he will have to appear there and his case will now proceed in Texas.

I can say that the indictment in Texas, the large majority of -- certainly the statutory e-mails here are not part of the Texas case, of course. But the e-mails relating to DCVC, the e-mails relating to the California intake attorney, that is also not part of the indictment in the Southern District of Texas case, just to the extent that's relevant to

your Honor.

MS. BAGLIEBTER: It covers, based on the indictment, it covers a set of e-mails, I believe they were sent on January 22, 2023, so still part of the same time period, the same two-month time period. It focuses more on the threats in the Harris County probate court system. It includes, I believe the first count in that case is one of the e-mails that Michael Devitt spoke about which references things in Harris County, but it wasn't a direct threat to Mr. Devitt. And then there's a threat that was to ABC News and some news outlets in Texas. And then the other ones are very similar in nature, but not the ones that were specifically admitted into evidence at trial.

THE COURT: Is it the same charges?

MS. BAGLIEBTER: Four count of 875(c).

THE COURT: Are there also pending charges in Canada and/or San Francisco?

MS. BAGLIEBTER: So there was a case in Canada, and I think that case is still pending, but I don't know. I think that they had sort of left it open at the time that he waived extradition and came here. And in San Francisco it's related to — it is a non-threats related issue, and it is an arson charge.

THE COURT: That's still open as well?

MS. BAGLIEBTER: I believe so.

1	THE COURT: Thank you.
2	Mr. Joseph, anything you'd like to add before
3	sentencing?
4	MR. JOSEPH: No. Like I said before, I hadn't
5	received the Houston case file. I realize there is additional
6	charges in Houston. I realize that the charges were not
7	merged. So there is another opportunity to be sentenced longer
8	in Houston.
9	THE COURT: But do you want to argue for what the
10	sentence should be here?
11	MR. JOSEPH: No.
12	THE COURT: All right. And you said you wanted to
13	present some motions?
14	MR. JOSEPH: Yes, just to file with the court I spoke
15	about earlier.
16	THE COURT: We can take those. These don't relate to
17	the sentencing, is that right?
18	MR. JOSEPH: No. There is an affidavit for
19	designation at Fort Dix.
20	THE COURT: Okay.
21	MR. JOSEPH: But from I guess it would be an open
22	question considering I have open charges in Houston, whether or
23	not I will be going to Fort Dix or any other place, or if I

would be transferred directly to Houston. It doesn't seem like

the DoJ knows the answer to that.

THE COURT: Do you know anything about the timing, the usual timing of that?

MS. BAGLIEBTER: I don't. In terms of his designation, I think my assumption base is BOP would not designate him if he was going to be sent to Texas first, and he would go to Texas. I believe there is a detainer for him, so at the time that he's slated for -- if Texas doesn't writ him to Texas sooner, at the time that he would be set to release, I believe the detainer would have him transferred to the Southern District of Texas. My expectation is if there is a period of time after today that he's still incarcerated on these charges, that Texas could writ him to Texas sooner and start their case against him there. And then my assumption is they would designate him after both of those cases had concluded. But it's possible that BOP would do it differently.

THE COURT: You've asked for a designation to Fort Dix, Mr. Joseph, due to you said programming and proximity to friends. Is that right?

MR. JOSEPH: Correct.

THE COURT: Have you had mental health treatment while at MDC?

MR. JOSEPH: Right now, I'm a suicide watch companion.

THE COURT: Did you say you are a companion?

MR. JOSEPH: I am a companion.

THE COURT: You are.

MR. JOSEPH: So, I did a general psych review with them. I was fine with that. I've done psych reviews with the prison psychiatrist after the arson charge and after my mother died. And I was experiencing discrimination at DCVC, and then I saw a therapist for about a couple of years before they broke off and I went to Canada.

But in general, at MDC I've done the psych review that was a check, and then I became suicide watch companion.

THE COURT: I mean, MDC doesn't have the best programming because it's primarily a pretrial facility. I would like to have you get the most mental health treatment, both an evaluation and whatever intensive treatment they can give. I'm not sure what facility has that, but I think some facilities have better programming for intensive mental health treatment than others. So I was going to make the recommendation that you be designated to a facility that has robust mental health treatment.

Is there anything you want to say about that?

MR. JOSEPH: My understanding is Fort Dix does have that as well as programming to get back into the world. There's trauma programming as well as mental health for recovery after trauma. That's what attracted me to Fort Dix. And then also the close proximity to my friends who can visit.

THE COURT: All right. Anything else anybody wants to add before sentencing?

MS. BAGLIEBTER: Not from the government.

THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Joseph?

MR. JOSEPH: No.

THE COURT: In preparing to sentence defendant, I've considered the presentence report, the recommendation of probation, and the statements of the defendant and the government, and I've considered all the factors in 18 U.S.C. Section 3553(a), which is the law that governs sentencing. And I'm required to consider a bunch of factors: The nature and circumstances of the offense, the defendant's history and characteristics, and the purposes of sentencing, the need to reflect the seriousness of the crime, to promote respect for the law, provide just punishment, afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct, protect the public, and to provide any needed training or treatment to the defendant in the most effective manner. And of course I'm required to consider the sentencing guidelines.

I'm ultimately required to impose a sentence that is sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the sentencing purposes in the statute.

The defendant sent death threats to two of his former colleagues in December of 2022 and January of 2023. These death threats were filled with antisemitic language and other hateful language. They included personal details about the victims as well as photographs of weapons, and they contained

details about how and when he intended to kill the victims. In the short, these threats were intended to terrify and terrorize the victims, and they did.

As Ms. Bagliebter has pointed out very well, I think this was harmful conduct and it was conduct that really did terrify the victims. This was part of a pattern of threats by the defendant against many other people he had interacted with over the years. The defendant's conduct caused real harm. As I said, it terrified the victims and caused immeasurable distress and anxiety, and that was heightened by the nature of the threats, the level of pure hatred, and the detail in the threats.

The purposes of reflecting seriousness of the crime, promoting respect for the law, providing just punishment, assuring adequate deterrence, and protecting the public require a sentence that is serious. As I said, the guidelines call for a sentence of 21 to 27 months. Certainly not unreasonable, given the seriousness of the conduct here. If anything, that range may understate culpability in some ways because of the hateful nature of the threatening communications.

As I indicated, although I'd found that the hate crime enhancement does not apply, the conduct was more harmful, and the defendant is more culpable, given that the communications expressed bigotry and hate.

I'm also required to consider the history and

characteristics of the defendant. He has a history of substance abuse, mental health challenges, and other personal circumstances, including abuses that in some ways are mitigating and may explain why he's in the position he's in.

One of the purposes of sentencing is to provide treatment in the most effective manner. And I think even though I found Mr. Joseph competent to stand trial, competent to represent himself, I do think that he has mental health challenges, and I think that treatment that is intensive and effective is important.

I will recommend that he be designated to a BOP facility, Fort Dix or another facility that is able to address appropriate treatment for mental health. And while getting effective treatment might be more readily available outside of prison, there is no guarantee he'll obtain that treatment. And in any event, the other purposes of sentencing outweigh the need for treatment in the near future, given the seriousness and nature of the criminal conduct.

Ultimately, weighing those considerations, I believe that a sentence of 27 months, which is in the guideline range, is sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to serve the purposes of sentencing, followed by three years' supervised release.

I'd like to give the parties a chance to state any legal objection to that sentence before I impose it.

MS. BAGLIEBTER: No objection, your Honor.

MR. JOSEPH: No.

THE COURT: Mr. Joseph, you are hereby committed to the custody of the Bureau of Prisons for 27 months on both counts concurrent. Following release, you will be on supervised release for 3 years, again, on both counts concurrent, with the following conditions:

You will not commit another federal, state, or local crime. You will not possess or use an illegal controlled substance. You will submit to one drug testing within 15 days of placement on supervised release, and at least the two thereafter as directed by the probation officer. You will cooperate in the collection of DNA as directed by the probation officer.

The standard conditions are imposed with the following special conditions:

You will submit your person, any property, residence, vehicle, papers, computer, other electronic communications, data storage devices, cloud storage or media and effects to a search by any United States probation officer, and, if needed, with the assistance of any law enforcement. The search is to be conducted when there is reasonable suspicion concerning violation of a condition of supervision or unlawful conduct by the person being supervised. Failure to submit to a search may be grounds for revocation.

You will provide the probation officer with access to any requested financial information. You will not incur any new credit charges or open additional lines of credit without the approval of the probation officer unless you are in compliance with the payment schedule.

You will participate in an outpatient substance abuse treatment program approved by the probation office, which may include testing to determine whether you've reverted to use of drugs or alcohol. You'll also participate in a mental health treatment program approved by the probation office, and you will continue to take any prescribed medications unless otherwise instructed by the health care provider.

You will report to the nearest the probation office within 72 hours of release. You will be supervised by the district of your residence.

I'm not imposing a fine because I find you are not able to pay a fine. However, there is a mandatory special assessment of \$100 for each count, for a total of \$200, which is hereby imposed.

Mr. Joseph, you pled guilty and I accepted your plea. However, do you have a right to appeal from your conviction and sentence and I want to advise you of that right. You do have the right to appeal from your conviction and sentence, except to the extent you have waived that right as part of your guilty plea and by pleading guilty. If you cannot pay the cost of an

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1	appeal, you may apply for leave to appeal without payment of
2	any costs. Any appeal must be filed within 14 days.
3	I'll make a recommendation to the Bureau of Prisons
4	that you be designated to Fort Dix or other appropriate
5	facility that has appropriate treatment, and the BOP makes the
6	ultimate determination. I can only make a recommendation.
7	Is there anything further from I wanted to ask
8	about restitution, if the government wanted to address that.
9	MS. BAGLIEBTER: Your Honor, there is no restitution
10	at this time. The victims have been notified, but we have not
11	received any restitution requests.
12	THE COURT: Anything further from the government?
13	MS. BAGLIEBTER: No, your Honor. Because the
14	defendant pled open to the indictment, and there are no prior
15	indictments, there's no underlying indictments or open counts.
16	So no, your Honor.
17	THE COURT: Anything further, Mr. Joseph?
18	MR. JOSEPH: No.
19	THE COURT: Thank you. We are adjourned.
20	(Adjourned)
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